Core Parameters and Economics

To provide a quick reference, here is a summary of key parameters in the StableUnit system (initial or example values, many of which are subject to DAO governance):

Parameter	Value (Initial / Example)	Description
USD Pro Target Peg	$1.00 USD	Peg value of USD Pro. Maintained via market forces and protocol mechanisms.
Minimum Collateralization	~150% (for main assets)	The required collateral-to-debt ratio to open and maintain a position. E.g., 150% for ETH/stETH, higher for volatile or low-liquidity tokens. This ensures a buffer against price drops.
Liquidation Threshold	~110–125% (asset-dependent)	The ratio at which liquidation is triggered. Typically slightly above the minimum. If collateral value vs. debt falls below this, liquidation can occur.
Liquidation Penalty (Spread)	~5% total (e.g. 2% to liquidator, 3% to system)	The effective “discount” or fee taken during liquidation. A portion goes as incentive to the liquidator, the rest is kept by the protocol (often contributing to yield or reserves). This is smaller than traditional systems thanks to the no-competition model​.
Liquidation Execution Window	60 seconds (fixed)	Time given to a selected liquidator to complete a liquidation once triggered​. Ensures quick resolution but also time-bound to move to next if one fails.
Max Liquidators (Active)	21 (top stakers)	Number of liquidator slots available, determined by top veSuDAO token stakers​. These parties have rights to perform liquidations, cycling through in deterministic order.
Stability Fee (Borrow APR)	Variable (e.g. 0% to 5% APR)	Ongoing interest rate on USD Pro debt. Set per collateral type by DAO. Can be 0% for promotional or highly safe assets, or higher for riskier ones. Accrues continuously and feeds the yield reserve.
One-Time Minting Fee	None (0%) initially	(If applicable) A fee charged at the moment of borrowing. Likely zero in StableUnit’s design (MakerDAO typically has none; interest is primary cost). DAO can introduce if needed.
Debt Ceiling	Varies by asset (e.g. $50M for ETH)	The maximum USD Pro that can be generated from a particular collateral type. Prevents overexposure. The DAO will set these and can adjust over time (for instance, increasing ETH debt ceiling as system grows).
Protocol-Owned Liquidity Target	10% of stablecoin collateral per asset	The target fraction of liquidity to be owned by protocol for each major stablecoin pair (USDC/USD Pro, USDT/USD Pro). If POL < 10%, the protocol “rents” liquidity via incentives or OTC; above 10%, excess stablecoins are converted to USD Pro and some debt paid off​. This helps maintain deep liquidity for peg stability.
Circuit Breaker Threshold	15% of TVL per 24h​	The limit of value outflow (withdrawals, liquidations, etc.) in a rolling 24-hour window. If exceeded, the circuit breaker halts further outflows temporarily. This protects against bank runs or hacks.
Circuit Breaker Reset Options	Manual reset by DAO/admin, auto-reset after 24h, or DAO emergency vote​	If triggered, the circuit breaker can be turned off by an elected admin quickly (if false alarm), or it will automatically release funds after a day if no action, or the admin can escalate to require a full DAO vote for severe situations.
Total SuDAO Token Supply	16,000,000 (over 4 years)​	Max supply of governance tokens to be emitted. This affects governance and incentives (detailed in Tokenomics section). Not directly affecting USD Pro, but relevant for those participating in DAO/liquidations.
veToken Lock Durations	Up to 4 years (max boost)	Users can lock SuDAO to gain veSuDAO (voting power). Longer lock = more power and benefits​. E.g., locking for 4 years yields maximum boost. This encourages long-term alignment.
Liquidation Priority Staking	veSuDAO (locked SuDAO) required	Only users who lock SuDAO (thus obtaining voting escrowed SuDAO) are eligible for liquidator selection. The more you lock, the higher your rank to possibly be in top 21. This mechanism ties system security (liquidators) to governance stake.

Note: Many of these parameters are configurable by governance. Initial values are chosen based on risk assessments and can be updated via DAO proposals. For instance, if market volatility increases, the DAO might raise collateral ratios or liquidation fees. Conversely, they might lower the stability fee for a popular collateral to encourage adoption. Always refer to the latest official documentation or parameter dashboard for up-to-date values.